Credible Threats in Negotiations. A Game-theoretic Approach



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Éditeur :

Kluwer Academic Publishers


Paru le : 2002



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Description

The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date.
Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.
Pages
n.c
Collection
n.c
Parution
2002
Marque
Kluwer Academic Publishers
EAN papier
0306475391
EAN PDF
0306475391

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
1
Nombre pages imprimables
10
Taille du fichier
1445 Ko
Prix
151,80 €

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