Differential Information Economies

de

,

Éditeur :

Springer


Collection :

Studies in Economic Theory

Paru le : 2005-12-28

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Description
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined. 
Pages
650 pages
Collection
Studies in Economic Theory
Parution
2005-12-28
Marque
Springer
EAN papier
9783540214243
EAN PDF
9783540269793

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
6
Nombre pages imprimables
65
Taille du fichier
5140 Ko
Prix
210,99 €