The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Why Strategic Superiority Matters

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Oxford University Press


Paru le : 2018-01-25



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For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.
Pages
240 pages
Collection
n.c
Parution
2018-01-25
Marque
Oxford University Press
EAN papier
9780190849184
EAN PDF
9780190849191

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
0
Nombre pages imprimables
0
Taille du fichier
20910 Ko
Prix
9,39 €
EAN EPUB
9780190849207

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
0
Nombre pages imprimables
0
Taille du fichier
2089 Ko
Prix
9,39 €

Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is the author or editor of six books, including Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

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