Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings

A Model of Peering in the Voice-over-IP Telecommunications Market

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Éditeur :

Springer


Collection :

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Paru le : 2011-10-20



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Description
This book provides a game theoretic model of interaction among VoIP telecommunications providers regarding their willingness to enter peering agreements with one another. The author shows that the incentive to peer is generally based on savings from otherwise payable long distance fees. At the same time, termination fees can have a countering and dominant effect, resulting in an environment in which VoIP firms decide against peering. Various scenarios of peering and rules for allocation of the savings are considered. The first part covers the relevant aspects of game theory and network theory, trying to give an overview of the concepts required in the subsequent application. The second part of the book introduces first a model of how the savings from peering can be calculated and then turns to the actual formation of peering relationships between VoIP firms. The conditions under which firms are willing to peer are then described, considering the possible influence of a regulatory body.
Pages
297 pages
Collection
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Parution
2011-10-20
Marque
Springer
EAN papier
9783642210952
EAN EPUB
9783642210969

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
2
Nombre pages imprimables
29
Taille du fichier
1843 Ko
Prix
94,94 €